This note proposes the continuous treatment approach as a valuable alternative to propensity score matching for evaluating economic effects of merger and acquisitions (M&As). This framework allows to consider the variation in treatment intensities explicitly, and it does not call for an arbitrary definition of cut-off values in traded ownership shares in order to construct a binary treatment indicator. We demonstrate the usefulness of this approach using data from European M&As and by relying on the example of post-M&A employment effects.The empirical exercise reveals (substantial) differences over the whole distribution of acquired ownership shares and across different types of M&As and country groups.
Introduction
Empirical research on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) is inconclusive with regard to the economic effects of firm takeovers. 1 This note provides one possible explanation for this observation, pointing to the more or less arbitrary definition of cutoff-values in traded ownership shares that is typically used in empirical applications. Focusing exclusively on such cutoffs (commonly used ones are 25 or 50 percent), one might ignore that the extent to which new owners are able to influence a firm's strategic decisions varies over a wide range of ownership levels.
One important aspect that affects a new owner's ability to impose strategic changes within the newly acquired entity concerns corporate governance regulations. In theoretical terms, corporate governance constitutes a set of regulations and constraints that aim to address problems arising from the separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means 1932, Williamson 1985) .
Separated ownership and control paired with asymmetric information is likely to result in nonzero agency costs due to the incentives for opportunistic behavior (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976) .
In the context of M&As, corporate governance regulations shape both the pre-and postacquisition behavior of acquirung firms (see, e.g., Gugler and Yurtoglu 2008) . With regard to the latter, new (majority) owners are, for example, limited in their strategic decision making as minority owners' interests might be protected by corporate governance regulations. Table A .1 in the Appendix provides a description of certain corporate governance regulations in selected European countries (included in our empirical exercise). To give just two examples: Ownership of 75 percent plus one vote assures to overcome blocking minorities (typically at 25 percent) in many countries. At the other end of the ownership distribution, it might be mentioned that European corporate laws typically allow shareholders with (at least) five percent ownership to call for an extraordinary general meeting. The reported regulations commonly intend to strengthen the position of minority shareholders limiting the leeway of majority owners. With regard to potential restructuring measures that a new majority owner would like to impose after a successful M&A, corporate governance regulations might, therefore, be viewed as an explicit constraint for doing so. In this regard, the share of acquired ownership (inversely) measures the constraints a new owner is facing when imposing strategic changes.
From an econometric perspective, defining a discrete treatment variable from continuous ownership information reduces data variation and, in turn, might induce inaccurate estimates of M&A effects. Alternatively, one might rely on a continuous treatment approach based on generalized propensity score matching (GPSM) (see Imbens 2000, Hirano and Imbens 2004) . GPSM is widely applied in various fields of economics, 2 but not for M&A evaluation. Given that the strategic impact of a new shareholder on a firm's decisions is varying over the acquired ownership share, it seems particularly attractive for M&A evaluation for (at least) three compelling reasons: First, it allows to estimate heterogeneous effects of M&As over the whole ownership distribution. Second, one might aggregate M&A effects over any arbitrary subset of the distribution of traded shares. Finally, GPSM represents a straightforward generalization of the commonly applied propensity score matching (PSM) and is, therefore, easily available to the applied researcher.
One important strategic decision typically involved in a process of restructuring concerns the changes in employment after a M&A. In what follows, we thus rely on the example of post-M&A employment effects to illustrate the economic importance of explicitly accounting for variation in the treatment intensity as measured by acquired ownership shares.
A continuous treatment approach for M&A evaluation
In the program literature, it is of particular interest to evaluate of the economic consequences of a specific program, such as job-training or school vouchers. Based on a counterfactual framework developed in the seminal contribution of Rubin (1974) , several scholars have proposed alternative econometric (statistical) approaches for the identification of causal program effects.
Among these methods is the so-called PSM approach pioneered by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) . For discrete treatment information (i.e., the observational unit received a treatment or not), this approach proposes to estimate a model for the probability to receive treatment with the resulting model prediction, known as the propensity score. Further, PSM assumes that, given this propensity score, selection into the treatment is unconfounded. In other words, the treatment is independent from the potential outcomes with or without treatment. Accordingly, conditioning on the propensity score is sufficient to accurately estimate the causal treatment effect. For practical purposes, PSM methods typically involve the comparison of outcomes of a treated unit with an untreated control unit with the most similar propensity score. GPSM, as proposed by Imbens (2000) and Hirano and Imbens (2004) extends this reasoning to treatment information that is measured in a continuous fashion.
In M&A evaluation, the treatment is typically based on the relative ownership shares involved in transactions. By definition, this measure can be continuously distributed within the [0, 1] interval. In contrast to PSM which is based on a (arbitrarily defined) binary M&A indicator, GPSM explicitly takes advantage of the variation in treatment intensities (see Imbens and Wooldridge 2009, for an overview). Accordingly, this approach allows to estimate the impact of M&As on acquired firms at any level of acquired ownership shares and thus allows to more directly assess the impact of corporate governance regulation for M&A induced economic effects.
GPSM is implemented in three steps (see, e.g., Fryges and Wagner 2008, Appendix I) : In the first step, one has to estimate the conditional distribution of the treatment variable given a set of observable characteristics, which in our case reads as
where X i denotes a vector of covariates observed for each firm i. D i is the treatment intensity, measured as the traded ownership shares ranging from zero to one. β represents the parameter vector to be estimated, and Λ(·) is the cdf of the logistic distribution (see Papke and Wooldridge 1996) which guarantees that 0 < λ(X i β) < 1 for all X i β ∈ R. The conditional distribution of the treatment given the covariates thus is given by exp(X i β) 1+exp(X i β) . For fractional response data, that are bounded by the [0,1] intveral, Papke and Wooldridge (1996) propose a quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) of β based on the Bernoulli log-likelihood function which is defined as
( 2) Equipped with consistent estimates for β from maximizing the sum of l i (β) over all observations, the estimated generalized propensity score, R i , can be expressed aŝ
The second step involves to estimate the conditional expectation of ∆Y i (e.g., post-M&A employment growth) given the treatment variable D i and the estimated propensity score R i . Following Hirano and Imbens (2004) , we chose a quadratic approximation for the conditional expectation of ∆Y i , given by
Equation (4) is estimated by OLS. The third step comprises to calculate the average treatment effect for any intensity interval d (in our case 10 percent traded ownership), making use of the obtained parameter estimates from the second step
Standard errors for the conditional expectations are calculated via bootstrapping methods. In the empirical exercise discussed below, we report 95 percent confidence intervals based on 500 bootstrap replications. across groups of countries (see, e.g., Oberhofer, Stöckl, Winner 2012) . Table 1 provides some summary statistics on our dataset. The first column in Table 1 reveals that the acquired ownership share in our sample is relatively large. This is mainly driven by the relative large number of 100% acquisitions. The minimum value, however, indicates that also very small shares are traded. Focusing on the outcome of interest, the average employment growth rate over a two-year post-acquisition window amounts to 1.5 percent across all acquired firms (see the top of Table 1 ). In the random control group reported at the bottom of the Table, average employment growth is 1 percentage points lower. Furthermore, acquisition targets are, on average, more profitable (measured in terms of returns on assets), four times larger, six and a half years older, more capital intense (total assets per employee) and more productive (value added per employee).
A comparison of minority and majority acquired targets also reveals some interesting differences. Minority M&A targets (with a maximum of 50 percent ownership acquisition) grow faster, are almost ten times larger, ten years older, more capital intense, more productive but less profitable then majority acquired targets. Most strinkingly, 42 percent of all minority M&A targets are publicly quoted and these firms control a large number of subsidiaries (i.e, 23.8 on average) and are themselves controlled by an average of 16.5 shareholders.
These substantial differences across minority and majority acquisition target support the inclusion of a large control group containing of non-acquired firms. Any propensity score based approach crucially relies on the balancing property assumptions which states that firms with alike propensity scores are also not systematically different in their observable characteristics.
Focusing on the minimum and maximum values reported for the M&A targets and the nonacquired control firms one observes a reasonable overlap in the realisations of all covariates of interest. This should allow to find proper control firms for the GPSM approach to work well. Firm size (employees) 0.0051 * * * 0.0016 * * * 0.0034 * * * 0.0057 * * * 0.0029 * * * (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0008) Firm age 0.0026 * * * 0.0011 * * 0.0014 * * 0.0030 * * * 0.0017 (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0017) Firm age × firm size −0.0004 * * * −0.0001 −0.0003 * * * −0.0005 * * * −0.0001 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) Capital intensity −0.0021 * * * −0.0012 * * * −0.0009 * * * −0.0022 * * * −0.0016 * * (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0008) Return on assets 0.0010 * * * 0.0003 * 0.0007 * * * 0.0016 * * * −0.0011 * * * (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) Labor productivity 0.0062 * * * 0.0032 * * * 0.0030 * * * 0.0060 * * * 0.0061 * * * (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0012) Publicly quoted 0.0079 * * * 0.0048 * * * 0.0028 * * 0.0074 * * * 0.0041 * * (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0017) Subsidiaries −0.0001 * * 0.0000 −0.0001 * * * −0.0001 * * 0.0001 * * (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) Shareholders −0.0008 * * * −0.0003 * * * −0.0005 * * * −0.0009 * * * −0.0006 * * (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) Notes: Marginal effects reported. Robust Standard errors in parentheses. * , * * , * * * Significant at 10-, 5-and 1-percent level.
Estimation results
Furthermore, due to the inclusion of a large control group it seems that general equilibrium effects of M&A's are less of importance, which in turn is an important assumption underlying most treatment estimation approaches (see, e.g., Heckman, Lochner and Taber 1998) . 6 Moreover, the (Pseudo-)R 2 measures are around 10 percent, suggesting that the included covariates are suitable to explain some variation in our treatment intensity, which in turn indicates that GPSM works well. This is also confirmed by a series of balancing property tests based on Hirano and Imbens (2004) . 7 Accordingly, the inclusion of a control group containing non-acquired firms allows to identify appropriate matches for the evaluation of the M&A induced employment effects and any value of acquired ownership shares. It might be interesting to contrast these results with the ones of standard PSM methods using pre-defined ownership shares as treatment variable. Here, we estimate two alternatives: In the first (second) one, the treatment indicator takes on a value of one only for majority (minority) acquisitions above (below or equal) 50 percent of all shares. In both cases, the propensity score is based on the same covariates as in our GPS methodology and the other M&A transactions (either minority or majority) are excluded. We estimate positive and significant employment effects under both alternatives, which also confirms the findings reported in Oberhofer (2013) for similar data. The average employment effect if minority M&As amounts to 3.84 percent thus exceeding the one for majority takeovers (i.e, 2.24 percent). The reason for this becomes obvious form Panel (a) in Figure 1 . The positive employment effect is lowest for 100 percent takeovers. Furthermore, full acquisitions constitute the vast majority of all cases. The PSM based estimate is given by a weighted average of all treatment effects which is dominated by 6 General equilibrium effects of M&As might be present when the merging firms (representing the treatment group) affect the market situation of their non-merging competitors (the control group). So far, this issue has not been addressed in the empirical M&A literature.
7 These are not reported in the 
Conclusion
This note proposes the application of a continuous treatment approach to analyze the economic effects of M&As. Rather than reducing variation in the treatment variable via the choice of more or less arbitrary cutoff-values in traded ownership shares, this framework allows to evaluate the impact of M&As over the whole distribution of treatment intensities. Furthermore, such an approach allows to more explicitly acknowledge the literature on the economics of corporate governance which identifies crucial constraints for the strategic decision making within firms.
Using a sample of European M&As and relying on the example of post-M&A employment effects, we observe that the impact of M&As varies considerably over the traded ownership distribution. At least, our suggestion for applied work in M&A evaluation would be to provide comprehensive sensitivity analysis at different cutoff-values in traded ownership shares. The recent contribution of Guardabascio and Ventura (2014) makes GPSM methodes more easily applicable in standard econometric software. This, together with an increasing availability of M&A data that are coupled with ownership structure information, could foster a broader discussion on corporate governance issues for M&A evaluation. France 5 percent have resolutions before general meeting 10 percent can demand information from company and/or apply court for investigation, 95 percent can squeeze out a minority 10 percent can bring a derivative action, 25 percent can request EGM, amendments to constitution need 75 percent Germany 10 percent can force special audit; 5 percent are required for an EGM 75 percent members of supervisory board can be removed, 10 percent action against wrongdoers Greece 5 percent can force EGM, require information from directors, seek an investigation (public)
Ireland based on UK law
Italy 10 percent can get court to investigate affairs, 10 percent can ask for EGM 20 percent can force an EGM; 2 percent can require investigations, 5 percent to challenge balance sheet 20 percent can force EGM, 95 percent compulsorily acquire the remaining 5 percent of members who refuse a bid (private)
Luxembourg restrictions on share transfer: only permitted if approved by 75 percent of the other shareholders (private) Netherlands 10 percent can force EGM or petition the court for an investigation. 95 percent can buy out a minority (private) Norway 10 percent can request EGM or special audit (private) 5 percent an convene EGM, 10 percent is needed for special audit (public)
Portugal 5 percent can trigger an EGM, 10 percent can demand written answers from directors 1 percent can inspect books of the company, 10 percent can secure new appointments to the audit committee (public) Spain 5 percent can call EGM, challenge resolutions. 5 percent can prevent the majority of shareholders ratifying a breach of duty Sweden 10 percent can compel company to bring action against directors, can compel directors to declare a dividend equal to half of year's net profit, 10 percent < /span>can ask for special examiner or for special audit (private & public)
Switzerland minority shareholders can request special audit, if denied 10 percent can apply court for special audit, force EGM UK 5 percent of a company has the right item placed on the Agenda at a General Meeting. 10 percen t right to force an audit
